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ESSAY 
Contracts and COVID-19 
Andrew A. Schwartz* 
Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020—as well as government orders to 
contain it—has prevented countless people, babysitters to basketball players, 
from fulfilling their contracts. Are all of these parties legally liable for breaching 
their contracts? Or are they excused due to this extraordinary event? What 
about payments made in advance, such as tickets bought for a concert that has 
now been canceled, or a dorm room leased at a college that is now closed? 
This coronavirus is new, but wars, floods, and even other pandemics have 
upset innumerable contracts over the years. In response, our courts have 
established a fairly clear set of legal rules—most importantly the doctrines of 
‘Impossibility’ and ‘Restitution’—to answer these questions. Beyond that, 
contracting parties can, and often do, “contract around” these legal doctrines by 
including a ‘Force Majeure’ clause, which specifies what should happen in case 
of an ‘Act of God’ like the coronavirus.1 
Part I of this Essay will describe the legal doctrines of Impossibility and 
Restitution and how they might apply to a contract undermined by the COVID-
19 pandemic. Part II will explain how a Force Majeure clause alters those 
background doctrines to give—or withhold—relief to a party whose 
performance has been thwarted by the pandemic. 
Finally, Subpart II.C will peer into the future and predict that many parties 
will likely revise their Force Majeure clauses to ensure they cover a pandemic 
like this. While such a revision may seem obvious from a legal perspective, it 
may not be optimal from a business perspective, as it may lead counterparties 
to greatly lower the price they are willing to pay—or even refuse entirely to 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. For helpful research assistance, I 
thank Ming Lee Newcomb. This Essay is dedicated to my parents on the occasion of the 
50th anniversary of their wedding contract. 
 1. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine 
and the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 794 (2010) (“[A] primary 
function of contract law is to establish ‘default’ or background terms that apply in the 
absence of an express term on point . . . . But if the parties so desire . . . they may vary 
from (contract around) any given default term, and courts will give effect to their 
derogation.”). 
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make a deal. Indeed, some parties may conclude that the default Impossibility 
doctrine provides better protection than a Force Majeure clause, as it covers 
any and all unexpected cataclysms, not just those expressly listed in the contract. 
I. Impossibility and Restitution 
A. In General 
Contracts are legally enforceable promises—and they remain enforceable 
even if performance turns out to be more challenging than expected.2 However, 
if contractual performance becomes impossible due to an extraordinary and 
exogenous event, the legal doctrine of Impossibility will excuse the party from 
performing and will not count the nonperformance as a breach of contract.3 
The same rule applies if performance has suddenly become so much more 
difficult and dangerous than expected as to be “impracticable” (meaning 
effectively impossible).4 And the outcome remains the same if a new law or 
government order prohibits the party from doing what she promised; this 
might be called ‘legal impossibility.’5 
The Impossibility doctrine is given a narrow scope and rarely applied, as it 
undermines the very nature of a contract as a legally enforceable promise.6 If 
courts regularly excused parties from their contracts when performance turned 
out to be tougher than expected, then parties would lose faith that contracts 
 
 2. Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 1, 7 (1864) (“[I]f a party by his contract charge 
himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good . . . . 
Unforeseen difficulties, however great, will not excuse him.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set 
of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
 3. Dermott, 69 U.S. at 7 (“[I]f a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation 
possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless its performance is rendered 
impossible by the act of God . . . .” (emphasis added)). By “exogenous” event, I simply 
mean that the supervening event was outside the control of the parties. 
 4. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 460 (Cal. 1916) (“A thing is impossible 
in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it 
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.” (quoting CHARLES FISK 
BEACH, JR., 1 A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 216 (1896))); 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2017); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Discharge by Supervening 
Impracticability”). 
 5. Dermott, 69 U.S. at 7 (“[I]f a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation 
possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless its performance is rendered 
impossible by . . . the law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 6. Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (observing that 
the Impossibility doctrine has “been applied narrowly, due in part to judicial 
recognition that the purpose of contract law is to allocate the risks that might affect 
performance and that performance should be excused only in extreme 
circumstances”). 
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really are legally enforceable.7 For this reason, a “mere change in the degree of 
difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased wages, prices of raw 
materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does 
not amount to impracticability since it is this sort of risk that a fixed-price 
contract is intended to cover.”8 “Furthermore, a party is expected to use 
reasonable efforts to surmount obstacles to performance, and a performance is 
impracticable only if it is so in spite of such efforts.”9 
Finally, there is the question of foreseeability. Courts often suggest that 
only ‘unforeseeable’ events can be the grounds for excuse under the 
Impossibility doctrine.10 The intuitive idea here is that “[b]ecause the purpose 
of a contract is to place the reasonable risk of performance upon the 
promisor . . . it is presumed to have agreed to bear any loss occasioned by an 
event that was foreseeable at the time of contracting.”11 
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, the Impossibility doctrine cannot 
really contain a strict requirement that the event at issue was unforeseeable. For 
one thing, the types of events that typically give rise to an Impossibility defense 
are natural disasters (“Acts of God”) that have happened many times in the past 
and will surely happen again in the future, such as fires, floods, or 
earthquakes.12 For another, anything and everything is foreseeable, at least to 
those with good imaginations. If aliens from outer space land on Earth, that 
might not be foreseen, but it is certainly foreseeable—after all, countless books 
and movies specifically entertain that very possibility.13 But if an alien invasion 
were to render contractual performance impossible, it seems clear that the 
Impossibility doctrine should apply. 
 
 7. See Mineral Park Land, 156 P. at 460 (“We do not mean to intimate that the defendants 
could excuse themselves by showing the existence of conditions which would make 
the performance of their obligation more expensive than they had anticipated, or 
which would entail a loss upon them.”). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 9. Id. (citation omitted). 
 10. E.g., Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Grp. Eng’rs, Clark Dietz Div., 775 F.2d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 
1985) (“The applicability of the defense of commercial impracticability, then, turns 
largely on foreseeability.”); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shelbourne Dev. Grp., 732 F. Supp. 
2d 809, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“If a contingency is foreseeable, however, the commercial-
impracticability defense is not available . . . .”); E. Capitol View Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. 
Robinson, 941 A.2d 1036, 1039 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“A party claiming that 
performance is impossible must prove that . . . the circumstances which made 
performance impossible were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was 
made.” (quoting Standardized Jury Instruction for the District of Columbia, No. 11-
12 (1998))); Kel Kim, 519 N.E.2d at 296 (“[T]he impossibility must be produced by an 
unanticipated event that could not have been foreseen or guarded against in the 
contract.”). 
 11. Waldinger Corp., 775 F.2d at 786. 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Events that come within the rule stated in this Section are generally due . . . to ‘acts 
of God . . . .’”). 
 13. E.g., E.T.: THE EXTRA-TERRESTRIAL (Universal Studios 1982). 
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Perhaps the best way to understand the role foreseeability plays in the 
Impossibility analysis is that it is “a relevant, but not dispositive, factor.”14 The 
rule apparently followed in Florida seems sensible: “The doctrine of 
impossibility of performance should be employed with great caution if the 
relevant business risk was foreseeable at the inception of the agreement and 
could have been the subject of an express provision of the agreement.”15 Thus 
if the parties enter into a contract after a hurricane has been spotted offshore, 
difficulties in performance due to that particular hurricane will likely not lead 
to a successful invocation of the Impossibility doctrine. 
Finally, if a party has been excused from her contract on the basis of 
Impossibility, that is not the end of the story. Under the legal doctrine of 
Restitution, which prohibits unjust enrichment at the expense of another,16 the 
excused party would have to return any payments received in advance.17 The 
excused party has not breached the contract, but neither has he performed, so 
it would be unjust for him to keep that money. (Pure reliance damages, by 
contrast, are generally not recoverable in Impossibility cases, since those were 
not paid over to the other side.18 Thus, in the seminal case of Taylor v. 
Caldwell, where a promoter rented a music hall that was subsequently 
destroyed by an accidental fire, the promoter could not recover the money he 
had spent on advertising the event prior to the venue’s destruction.19) 
 
 14. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 906 n.53 (1996); see Transatlantic Fin. 
Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“Foreseeability or even 
recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation.”). 
 15. Am. Aviation, Inc. v. Aero-Flight Serv., Inc., 712 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Harvey v. Lake Buena Vista Resort, LLC, 568 F. 
Supp. 2d 1354, 1367 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Home Design Ctr.—Joint Venture v. Cty. 
Appliances of Naples, Inc., 563 So. 2d 767, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to 
liability in restitution.”). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 377 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A party whose 
duty of performance . . . is discharged as a result of impracticability of performance . . . 
is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by 
way of part performance.”); id. cmt. a (“Furthermore, in cases of impracticability . . . 
the other party . . . is also entitled to restitution.”); Victor P. Goldberg, After Frustration: 
Three Cheers for Chandler v. Webster, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1161 (2011) (“[T]he 
majority position is that restitution should be made for work performed and money 
paid before the intervening event.”). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 377 illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (showing 
by example that pure reliance damages are not recoverable); Goldberg, supra note 17, 
at 1161-62 (explaining—and criticizing—the rule that reliance damages are not 
recoverable). 
 19. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312. 
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B. Application to COVID-19 
As a general matter, it seems clear that the doctrines of Impossibility and 
Restitution apply quite directly to contracts undermined by COVID-19 and the 
governmental response to it. 
Whether the COVID-19 pandemic was ‘foreseeable’ does not really matter, 
for the reasons discussed above in Part I.A. Pandemics have happened before, 
such as the Spanish Flu of 1918, and scientists and others have repeatedly 
warned that a pandemic should be expected to eventuate one of these days.20 
But the same can be said of hurricanes, avalanches—or structures going up in 
flames, as was the case in Taylor v. Caldwell.21 The mere fact that these natural 
disasters (or Acts of God) have happened in the past and will surely happen 
again in the future does not mean that the Impossibility doctrine ought not be 
applied in such cases. 
So, if a babysitter promised to look after your children once a week for $50, 
she is bound to the contract regardless of car trouble, the kids misbehaving, or 
other hardships. If the going gets tough and the babysitter gives up, that is a 
breach of contract and she is legally liable to you. This is what makes her 
contract a contract, and not an idle promise to give it a try. 
But if the babysitter failed to show up because the COVID-19 pandemic 
made it physically dangerous for her to enter your house, the Impossibility 
doctrine will come to her aid. Because the COVID-19 pandemic is an Act of 
God and so radically different from the ordinary risks and challenges of 
babysitting, and because it makes her performance so much more difficult and 
dangerous than expected, the law will excuse her nonperformance pursuant to 
the doctrine of Impossibility.22 The outcome is even clearer if the government 
has issued an order for the babysitter to remain home to avoid spreading the 
virus, as is, or was, the case in many states.23 Such a state order makes it legally 
impossible for the babysitter to perform. Finally, as a matter of Restitution, the 
babysitter would have to return any payments you made in advance. 
Consider another example: If you bought a $100 ticket for a Pearl Jam 
concert, and the event has been cancelled, there is no breach of contract, 
although Pearl Jam would have to refund your $100. What if you bought a 
nonrefundable $50 train ticket to travel to the concert? That is an example of 
 
 20. E.g., Victoria Y. Fan et al., Pandemic Risk: How Large Are the Expected Losses?, 96 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 129, 129 (Dec. 5, 2018) (“Few doubt that major epidemics and 
pandemics will strike again . . . .”); Katherine Harmon, What Will the Next Influenza 
Pandemic Look Like?, SCI. AM. (Sept. 19, 2011), https://perma.cc/JD39-JJR9 (reporting 
that “scientists and public health experts seemed to agree” that the relevant question 
regarding “the next influenza pandemic” “is when, not if,” it will occur). 
 21. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312. 
 22. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 23. E.g., Cal. Exec. Order N-33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/FC3J-PETS 
(requiring “all individuals living in the State of California to stay home or at their place 
of residence,” subject to certain exceptions). 
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reliance damages, and you would have to bear that loss yourself, since it was 
never paid over to Pearl Jam and thus not subject to restitution. 
These cases are relatively simple, but more difficult cases could be imagined 
where COVID-19 renders performance much more difficult or expensive, but 
not literally or legally impossible. For instance, suppose that a supplier promises 
to deliver a thousand baseball gloves, but its factory in New York is shut down 
by government order. At first blush, it seems that performance has become 
legally impossible. 
But what if those baseball gloves can be produced at another factory in 
Japan, with the result that the cost of production and shipping would be twice 
what the supplier expected? In that case, performance is probably merely more 
burdensome, and the courts would not relieve the supplier from the contract.24 
At some point, however, the added expense could rise to a level where a court 
would view performance as effectively Impossible. In one well-known case, the 
court granted relief where the cost of performance turned out to be ten times 
what was anticipated.25 But what if it were five times as expensive? This will be 
the sort of difficult judgment call courts will be called upon to make in coming 
years and, as they do, other litigants will have a better idea of where the line for 
Impossibility will lie. 
Another difficult type of case will be where performance is legally possible, 
perhaps because a state’s stay-at-home order has expired, but the pandemic 
remains prevalent. For instance, in the babysitter example above, should the 
babysitter be excused if the stay-at-home order expired yesterday, but she is 
concerned for her health if she comes over to babysit? If the babysitter is eighty 
years old, and therefore at special risk from COVID-19,26 then a court would 
likely excuse her on the basis of Impossibility. The physical danger of 
babysitting during the COVID-19 pandemic is so much higher than expected 
that her performance would be excused as effectively Impossible. 
But what if she is a perfectly healthy eighteen-year-old? Early reports 
indicate that the risk COVID-19 poses to her health is quite low, and not much 
 
 24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11 intro. note, at 311 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“In contracting for the manufacture and delivery of goods at a price fixed in 
the contract, for example, the seller assumes the risk of increased costs within the 
normal range.”). 
 25. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 459 (Cal. 1916) (describing “an expense 
of 10 or 12 times as much as the usual cost” as a “prohibitive cost” that justified 
relieving the promisor on the basis of Impossibility); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS ch. 11 intro. note, at 311 (AM. LAW INST.1981) (suggesting that if “a 
disaster results in an abrupt tenfold increase in cost to the seller, a court might 
determine that the seller did not assume this risk” and excuse the seller on the basis of 
Impossibility). 
 26. People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/J4PC-4L46 (last updated May 14, 2020) (“Based on 
currently available information and clinical expertise, older adults and people of any 
age who have serious underlying medical conditions might be at higher risk for severe 
illness from COVID-19.”). 
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different than the usual hazards of babysitting, such as a car accident on the way 
over.27 Assuming this scientific conclusion holds true, and recalling that the 
Impossibility doctrine is given a narrow scope, it seems likely that the eighteen-
year-old babysitter would probably remain bound to her contract, even if she is 
honestly worried about the danger she would face. That is the sort of self-
imposed impossibility that does not count as “exogenous.”28 (It is worth noting, 
however, that the law would never order her to actually babysit; rather, she 
would be liable for damages based on any increased cost of hiring a substitute 
babysitter.29 That might well be an “efficient breach” from her perspective.30) 
II. Force Majeure Clauses 
A. In General 
“Freedom of contract” allows private parties to change or shape the default 
rules of contract law that would otherwise apply.31 When it comes to the 
Impossibility doctrine, parties routinely include a standard clause known as a 
Force Majeure clause to “contract around” the rules described above in Part 
I.A.32 In other words, “the Force Majeure clause addresses the same issues that 
the default [Impossibility] doctrine would address, and it resolves those issues 
in the manner expressly described” in the parties’ contract.33 When a contract 
 
 27. Soumya Karlamangla, What’s the Risk of COVID-19 for a Healthy Young Person?, L.A. 
TIMES, (Mar. 11, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://perma.cc/VU9C-9MMU (reporting that the 
risk of serious illness due to COVID-19 for a teenager is very low). 
 28. See supra note 3. 
 29. “A court will refuse to grant specific performance of a contract for service or 
supervision that is personal in nature. The refusal is based in part upon the 
undesirability of compelling the continuance of personal association after disputes 
have arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone and, in some instances, of imposing 
what might seem like involuntary servitude.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 367 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see, e.g., Fla. Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd. v. Miami 
Sports & Exhibition Auth., 939 F. Supp. 855, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Fla. 
Panthers v. City of Miami, 116 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] personal services 
contract cannot be enforced by injunction or specific performance . . . .”); N. Del. 
Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E. W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431, 434 (Del. Ch. 1968) (“[P]erformance 
of a contract for personal services, even of a unique nature, will not be affirmatively 
and directly enforced . . . .”); RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.04 cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 2014) (“It is a longstanding rule of equity that specific performance of 
promises to work . . . will not be granted.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 367(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise to render personal service will not be 
specifically enforced.”). 
 30. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 128-38 (9th ed. 2014) 
(explaining the concept of “efficient breach”). 
 31. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 794. 
 32. Id. at 801. 
 33. Id. 
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includes a Force Majeure clause, the precise terms of that clause will control the 
outcome. 
There is no ‘boilerplate’ Force Majeure clause, as each one is the subject of 
negotiation between the parties.34 That said, they commonly follow a certain 
pattern that can be illustrated by quoting the Force Majeure clause at issue in 
one well known New York case, Kel Kim v. Central Markets: 
If either party to this Lease shall be delayed or prevented from the performance of 
any obligation through no fault of their own by reason of labor disputes, inability 
to procure materials, failure of utility service, restrictive governmental laws or 
regulations, riots, insurrection, war, adverse weather, Acts of God, or other 
similar causes beyond the control of such party, the performance of such 
obligation shall be excused for the period of the delay.35 
Using this clause as an example, we can see that it addresses the elements of the 
Impossibility doctrine, such as the requirement of exogeneity (“through no fault 
of their own”; “beyond the control of such party”), and includes a specific list of 
which types of extraordinary events will relieve a party from her legal 
obligations under the contract. As is common, it includes a catch-all provision 
(“other similar causes”) at the end of the list of specific events. 
Force Majeure clauses are strictly and narrowly construed for the same 
reason that courts demand a strong showing under the Impossibility doctrine.36 
The essence of a contract is that it is legally enforceable, through thick and thin, 
and only a cause that is specifically listed in the Force Majeure clause will excuse 
a party from his contract.37 Likewise, even the Force Majeure clause’s catch-all 
provision is interpreted narrowly to only cover “things of the same kind or 
nature as the particular matters mentioned.”38 
It should therefore come as no surprise that courts frequently reject claims 
of Force Majeure and only rarely hold that a party should be excused from the 
contract on this basis.39 It would be a mistake, however, to take this as evidence 
 
 34. But see Gideon Parchomovsky et al., Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
738, 786 (2007) (reporting that “force majeure clauses generally take the form of 
boilerplate language that simply parrots the default rules of impracticability”). 
 35. Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 n.* (N.Y. 1987). 
 36. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. 
 37. Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 445, 451 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2015) (“Force-majeure clauses are typically narrowly construed, such that the 
clause ‘will generally only excuse a party’s nonperformance if the event that caused 
the party’s nonperformance is specifically identified.’” (quoting In re Cablevision 
Consumer Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2012))); Kel Kim, 519 N.E.2d at 
296 (“Ordinarily, only if the force majeure clause specifically includes the event that 
actually prevents a party’s performance will that party be excused.”). 
 38. Kel Kim, 519 N.E.2d at 296-97. 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 296 (“[C]ontractual force majeure clauses . . . provide a . . . narrow 
defense.”); NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES: COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE 
COURTS § 114:36 (Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed. 2019) (observing that the force majeure 
clause is “rarely successfully relied upon”); Harold Alexander Lewis, Comment, 
footnote continued on next page 
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that parties rarely succeed in backing out of their contracts based on Force 
Majeure. The only time a Force Majeure clause would be litigated is when a 
party makes a baseless claim of Force Majeure and the other side is forced to 
sue, or in close cases where the proper meaning of the clause is unclear. Surely 
there are many instances where one party claims that the Force Majeure clause 
clearly applies to a certain situation, and the other side concurs. In such a 
scenario, the concurring party would simply allow the other party to be released 
from the contract, and the courts would never hear the case. The point is that 
while Force Majeure clauses are construed narrowly and rarely successful in 
court, they are likely invoked with some frequency outside the public eye. After 
all, it costs time, money, and goodwill to negotiate a Force Majeure clause, yet 
parties continue to do so.40 We should therefore conclude that Force Majeure 
clauses have utility and are successfully invoked more frequently than the 
reported cases would indicate. 
B. Application to COVID-19 
Does COVID-19, or the governmental response thereto, qualify as a Force 
Majeure event? The answer would depend on the specific Force Majeure clause 
at issue, especially the specific causes listed in the clause, as well as the actual 
impact the exogenous event had on the party claiming Force Majeure. That 
said, it is possible to make some general points that would likely be applicable 
to a typical Force Majeure clause, like the one from Kel Kim quoted above.41 
The term “pandemic” appears to be totally absent from Force Majeure 
clauses drafted prior to the current outbreak. A recent Westlaw search returned 
zero cases that involved a Force Majeure clause that include the term 
“pandemic.”42 A similar search for Force Majeure clauses that include the term 
 
Allocating Risk in Take-or-Pay Contracts: Are Force Majeure and Commercial 
Impracticability the Same Defense?, 42 SW. L.J. 1047, 1061 (1989) (“[I]n virtually all 
decisions addressing force majeure claims based on an inability to make a profit 
because of some cause beyond a party’s control, courts have rejected the [claim and 
refused to] excuse the party from its contractual obligation.”); Jacqueline McCormack, 
Note, Commercial Contracts in Muslim Countries of the Middle East: A Comparison with the 
United States, 37 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 11 (2009) (explaining how under American law, 
“there is a strict standard for force majeure that is difficult to meet”); see also Michael 
Polkinghorne & Charles Rosenberg, Expecting the Unexpected: The Force Majeure Clause, 
16 BUS. L. INT’L 49, 59 (2015) (“International arbitrators have a tendency to construe 
force majeure clauses narrowly.”). 
 40. See generally Schwartz, supra note 1, at 801 (“[F]reedom of contract allows private 
parties to arrange their transactions in almost any way they wish. But, given the 
relatively high rates charged by attorneys, actually doing so is rather expensive.”). 
 41. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 42. On April 19, 2020, a search of Westlaw’s “All State & Federal” database for (“force 
majeure” & pandemic) returned three cases, none of which mentioned a Force 
Majeure clause with the term “pandemic.” One was a 2020 case dealing with the 
COVID-19 pandemic that noted the absence of a force majeure clause in the contract 
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“epidemic”43 returned only 74 cases.44 By comparison, a simple Westlaw search 
for “Force Majeure” returned more than 2,000 cases.45 As such, very few 
contracting parties will be able to point to a specific term in their Force Majeure 
clause that covers the present situation. 
This leaves two possibilities for a party seeking to be excused based on a 
Force Majeure clause: The “governmental laws” term or the “Act of God” 
provision. The former would depend on the precise order in place. If a state has 
ordered people to stay home and businesses to cease operations, this would fall 
squarely within the Force Majeure clause, at least for the duration of the order. 
Once the order is lifted, the party would no longer be excused and would have 
to perform as promised. If a state has made a less-restrictive order, or 
recommendations without the force of law, that would likely not come within 
the “governmental laws” Force Majeure clause. 
Turning to the “Act of God” provision, the question will be whether the 
COVID-19 pandemic is viewed as akin to other types of natural disasters, like 
hurricanes, earthquakes, or avalanches. This is a delicate question, and 
reasonable minds may differ. Some commentators have tentatively suggested 
that the COVID-19 pandemic would likely not qualify as an Act of God because 
its severity depends on human action or inaction.46 Other commentators, 
likewise tentative, have taken the opposite position.47 
 
at issue. Tracey v. Recovco Mortg. Mgmt. LLC, No. CV 20-3298 (MAS) (TJB), 2020 
WL 1666603, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2020). The second was a notable case involving a 
Material Adverse Change clause, which is not really a Force Majeure clause, as it alters 
the Frustration doctrine, not the Impossibility doctrine. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi 
AG, No. CV 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *1, *57 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) 
(quoting and following Schwartz, supra note 1). And the third is a case where the 
relevant contract did not include a Force Majeure clause; the reference to “pandemic” 
is in the name of a statute. NBC-USA Hous., Inc., Twenty-Six v. Donovan, 774 F. 
Supp. 2d 277, 300, 305 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 43. An epidemic is a localized outbreak of disease; thus, a pandemic, which is a global 
outbreak of disease, would count as an epidemic as well. The upshot is that a Force 
Majeure clause that included the term “epidemic” would be triggered by either an 
epidemic or a pandemic. 
 44. On April 19, 2020, a search of Westlaw’s “All State & Federal” database for (“force 
majeure” & epidemic) returned 74 cases. A quick review indicates that many of these 
do indeed reference a Force Majeure clause that included the term “epidemic.” 
 45. On April 19, 2020, a search of Westlaw’s “All State & Federal” database for (“force 
majeure”) returned 2,393 cases. 
 46. David B. Saxe & Michael Mix, Contractual Force Majeure Provisions and the Spreading 
Coronavirus, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 9, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://perma.cc/77D4-XJ53 
(“[C]oronavirus might not be considered an act of God . . . .”); Glenn D. West, 
Impossibility, Impracticability, Frustration, Force Majeure, Efficient Breach, and COVID-19, 
GLOBAL PRIV. EQUITY WATCH (Mar. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/QW6W-BQ6H (“[I]t 
is far from clear whether the term ‘act of God’ encompasses epidemics and pandemics 
even though they are the result of natural causes.”). 
 47. Stephen Wright et al., Is Coronavirus a Force Majeure Event?, DLA PIPER, (Mar. 30, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/G2K3-C42F (“[A]n ‘act of god’ will probably include COVID-
19 . . . .”). 
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As for the present author, I expect that the COVID-19 pandemic will likely 
qualify as an Act of God (subject, of course, to the phrasing of the specific clause 
at issue). An earthquake is still an Act of God, whether or not the factory has 
been built to be earthquake-proof. A hurricane is still an Act of God, even if it 
is partially a consequence of human-caused climate change. And a pandemic is 
still an Act of God, even if it was spread by people flying in human-built 
airplanes or exacerbated by human behavior (e.g., attending church or taking a 
cruise). Nor does it matter that pandemics are foreseeable and, in fact, have been 
predicted. The same is true of all Acts of God. (That said, a party to a contract 
made today, following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, would not be 
excused on the basis of this event.) 
Finally, even if the COVID-19 pandemic or a government order qualifies 
as a Force Majeure event, a party would only be excused under a Kel Kim-like 
clause if the pandemic or a subsequent order actually “delayed or prevented” the 
party from performing.48 In some cases, such as an arena closed by government 
order, a band who promised to play a concert there is clearly prevented from 
performing and would thus be excused. In many cases, however, performance 
would likely not be prevented but merely rendered more difficult or expensive, 
as in the baseball glove example discussed above.49 As discussed there, the 
relevant question would be whether the additional expense or difficulty is so 
great as to make it effectively impossible for the party to perform. 
C. Drafting for Future Pandemics 
This will not be the last pandemic that renders performance more difficult 
than anticipated. Pandemics have happened in the past and will certainly 
return, just like hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and war. Now that the risk of 
pandemics has become salient, we are certain to see parties add terms like 
‘epidemic’ and ‘pandemic’ to Force Majeure clauses in future contracts, as many 
commentators are now recommending.50 
The same thing happened after the terrible terrorist acts of September 11, 
2001.51 Prior to that date, there appears to be only one reported case involving 
 
 48. Kel Kim, 519 N.E.2d at 296 n.*. 
 49. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
 50. See, e.g., Saxe & Mix, supra note 46 (“[G]oing forward, parties should insist that their 
contracts include ‘epidemic’ as a force majeure event in case performance becomes 
impossible due to coronavirus or a future epidemic.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, “A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall”—Terrorism and Excused Contractual 
Performance in a Post September 11th World, 17 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 1, 33 (2004) 
(“[C]ontracting parties should . . . address risks involved with terrorism expressly in 
their contractual agreements. This may be done by adding a force majeure clause, 
including excuse of performance for terrorist acts and activity . . . .”); David Gurnick 
& Tal Grinblata, Be Prepared—Managing Catastrophic Risks in Franchise Systems, 21 
FRANCHISE L.J. 128, 132 (2002) (“By now, it is obvious that terrorism should be 
included in a force majeure clause.”); see also Jodi Fedor, Riots! Pandemics! Active 
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a Force Majeure clause that included the term “terrorism,” indicating that the 
practice was quite rare.52 Since then, there have been dozens of cases that quote 
Force Majeure clauses including the terms “terrorism” or “terrorist,” suggesting 
that use of these terms has become much more common.53 
From a lawyer’s perspective, then, it seems obvious to add “pandemic” to 
all Force Majeure clauses from here on out. From a business perspective, 
however, things are more complicated. Contract negotiations are dynamic, and 
your counterparties will respond if you seek to include “pandemic” to the Force 
Majeure clauses contained in future contracts. All else being equal, they will 
offer a lower price, because you are foisting the risk of nonperformance on to 
them. 
If a baseball glove manufacturer demands an expanded Force Majeure 
clause that includes pandemics, its buyers might offer only $8 per glove, rather 
than the $10 per glove they paid in the past.54 Accepting the lower price might 
be a good idea—or it might not. It depends on the chances of a pandemic hitting 
in any given year, as well as the cost of other alternative ways for the 
manufacturer to protect itself. If the manufacturer can buy insurance that 
would cover the contract damages for $1 per glove, then it seems prudent to 
use the same old Force Majeure clause, get the full $10 per glove price, and buy 
insurance for $1 per glove. This way, it would get the same protection and also 
a higher price ($9 per glove). But what if the insurance company goes bankrupt 
and fails to pay out when you need it? This is another risk that must be 
 
Shooters!: Thinking About the Unthinkable When Negotiating Real Estate Documents (with 
Sample Provisions), PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Mar. 2017, at 5 (“After 9-11, New York leases 
addressed security measures related to terror events and revisited force majeure 
clauses . . . .”). 
 52. On April 19, 2020, a search of Westlaw’s “All State & Federal” database for (“force 
majeure” /p terror!) returned four cases decided prior to September 11, 2001, and only 
one of those cases (R & B Falcon Corp. v. Am. Expl. Co., 154 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974 (S.D. 
Tex. 2001)) actually included a Force Majeure clause that included the word 
“terrorism” or “terrorist.” Accord Gurnick & Grinblata, supra note 51, at 132 (“Reported 
decisions [prior to 2002] concerning force majeure clauses in franchise disputes 
indicate that parties have not often considered the threat of terrorism in drafting the 
clauses.”). 
 53. On April 19, 2020, a search of Westlaw’s “All State & Federal” database for (“force 
majeure” /p terror!) returned 69 cases decided after September 11, 2001, and a brief 
review shows that most of these are quoting Force Majeure clauses that include terms 
like “terrorism” or “terrorist act.” E.g., Elavon, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 841 
F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (quoting a Force Majeure clause from a 
2002 contract that includes the term “acts of terrorism”). 
 54. At the extreme, the buyer might even walk away from the deal and find another 
supplier who promises to perform, no matter the difficulty. See, e.g., Carpenter Paper 
Co. v. Kearney Hub Pub. Co., 78 N.W.2d 80, 82 (Neb. 1956) (president of newspaper 
company testified that he switched from one newsprint supplier to another because 
the latter promised to deliver paper “come hell or high water”). 
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considered. In the end, there is not a simple legal answer to the risk of 
pandemics—rather, it is a nuanced decision that requires business judgment.55 
Thinking more broadly, the savvy business move may be to delete the 
Force Majeure clause entirely and rely on the default Impossibility doctrine for 
protection. Pandemics are top of mind right now, just as terrorism was in 2001, 
but to insist on those terms in future Force Majeure clauses is to fight the last 
war. There are countless other disasters that might come to pass in the future 
and make performance more difficult, from super-volcanoes to meteors 
colliding with the earth. If you try to list all of these in a Force Majeure clause, 
they will be interpreted narrowly, and you may well fail to include the one that 
eventuates.56 If you add ‘meteor collision with the earth,’ but a comet, rather 
than a meteor, ends up hitting the earth, a court would likely hold that calamity 
not to be covered. If you exclude the Force Majeure clause entirely, the court 
would likely treat a comet collision the same as it would a meteor crash. On the 
other hand, a court might view the excision of a Force Majeure clause as an 
agreement to accept all risks of nonperformance. In the end, the solution calls 
for careful legal and business judgment. 
Conclusion 
The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has upset contractual expectations 
around the country and the world. As with other natural disasters, the common 
law doctrines of Impossibility and Restitution will apply to contracts upended 
by the coronavirus pandemic and related government orders. If a contract 
contains a Force Majeure clause, however, the terms of that clause will control. 
Looking forward, we should expect that future Force Majeure clauses will 
commonly include a specific reference to pandemics (or epidemics), although 
some parties may decide that they are better off without a Force Majeure clause 
at all. 
 
 55. See Rufus Calhoun Young, Jr. & Dwight H. Merriam, Commentary, Homeland Security 
Begins at Home: Local Planning and Regulatory Review to Improve Security, LAND USE L. & 
ZONING DIG., Nov. 2003, at 3 (2003) (“In future contracts, or amendments, specify that 
‘acts of terrorism’ are included, or excluded, from the definition of force majeure, 
depending on how and to whom this risk is to be assigned.” (emphasis added)). 
Pursuant to the “business judgment rule” of corporate law, business decisions made 
by the board of directors “will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own 
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.” See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
 56. See P.J.M. Declercq, Modern Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in 
Situations of Commercial Impracticability, 15 J.L. & COM. 213, 234-35 (1995) (“Should the 
drafter spend his/her time thinking of possible events that might occur and list them 
all in the contract? This article submits that the drafter should not. Instead of listing 
as many events as possible, the drafter should focus on the effects that force majeure 
events are likely to have on the performance of the contract.” (emphasis omitted)). 
